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I
Introduction
“If parliament were to ask six economists for an opinion, 
seven answers would come back-two, no doubt, from the 
volatile Mr. Keynes. If economists cannot agree among 
themselves, how can the rest of the world be expected to 
agree with them and to respect their recommendations?”
Samuelson (1966, p. 1628)
Samuelson’s question is a weighty one, although 
the premise, that economists cannot agree among 
themselves, deserves the support of some empirical, 
rather than merely anecdotal evidence. Kearl, Pope 
and others (1979) were the first to seek such evidence. 
Using a questionnaire containing 30 questions that were 
more or less evenly divided between microeconomic 
and macroeconomic issues, these authors set out to 
measure the degree of consensus among United States 
economists in the late 1970s. Not long afterwards, 
Frey, Pommerehne and others (1984) used a similar 
questionnaire to identify areas of agreement and 
disagreement among economists in Austria, France, 
Germany and Switzerland. The list continued to 
lengthen thereafter: Block and Walker (1988) conducted 
a similar study in Canada, then Ricketts and Shoesmith 
(1992) did the same in the United Kingdom, after which, 
as Anderson (1998, p. 6) meticulously documents, 
studies were carried out in Australia, Belgium, New 
Zealand, Russia, South Africa and 10 countries of East 
and South-East Asia.
This enumeration immediately raises the question: 
why were no similar surveys conducted among Spanish-
speaking economists at any time during that decade? 
Since the present author is one of that breed, we shall 
ignore the possible sociological explanations for this 
and confine ourselves to noting that, after the turn 
of the millennium, Caminal and Rodríguez (2003) 
remedied the absence of their country from the list 
by conducting a study on the degree of consensus 
among Spanish academics. The present study sets out 
to continue this work for Mexico, apparently the first 
country in Latin America where a survey has been 
conducted for this purpose.
The questionnaire required opinions to be 
expressed on 30 questions concerning matters we 
considered crucial for the Mexican economy. For the 
purposes of comparison, we tried to make as many 
questions as possible similar if not identical (in Spanish 
translation) to the 30 asked by Kearl, Pope and others 
(1979). But the years take their toll: Frey, Pommerehne 
and others (1984) discarded three of those questions 
as being somewhat dated, and we ended up rejecting a 
further seven for the same reason. To the 20 questions 
remaining we added 10 of our own to round out the 
questionnaire.
Section II that follows presents some aspects of 
the questionnaire design. Section III then discusses 
the content of the questionnaire and the basic 
results obtained, concentrating particularly on those 
propositions which produced the highest levels of 
consensus or dissension among economists. After this, 
section IV analyses response patterns among different 
groups of people, with a view to ascertaining whether 
personal characteristics such as age or sex played a 
significant role in the replies.
Section V then presents an analysis of answers 
to each of the propositions, following a twofold 
classification of these. First, they are divided into 
microeconomic (micro) and macroeconomic (macro) 
propositions. This makes it possible to evaluate a 
hypothesis that, a priori, would appear reasonable: 
micro propositions ought to elicit greater consensus 
 The author is grateful for the assistance of Óscar Guerra Ford and 
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on the electronic portal of the National Association of Economists, 
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than macro ones. The second classification distinguishes 
propositions that are or tend to be positive (“this can 
be done”) from those that are normative (“this ought 
to be so”). This is followed by an examination of the 
hypothesis, plausible on the face of it, that positive 
II
Design and implementation of the survey
proposals command a greater consensus than normative 
ones. Lastly, factor analysis is used to classify the 
questions not by a priori economic criteria, but purely 
on the basis of the statistical information. Section VI, 
lastly, presents some of the conclusions of this study.
The formal design of the survey followed four rules. 
The first, an obvious but important one, was that the 
number of questions should be kept to a minimum to 
avoid inconveniencing respondents. Also avoided as far 
as possible was the use of technical jargon that was not 
common to all generations of economists. For example, 
rather than refer by name to the real business cycle 
theory developed by Edward Prescott and his followers, 
the questionnaire asked whether “economic fluctuations 
are mainly caused by aggregate supply impacts”.
The second rule was that the questions on the 
respondent’s personal characteristics should be at the 
end of the survey and phrased so as not to be indiscreet. 
These questions covered just six subjects: age, sex, 
country of residence, highest educational qualification, 
where this qualification was obtained, and sector of 
employment. Questions dealing explicitly with the 
respondent’s ideological or political leanings were 
deliberately avoided (by contrast with Caminal and 
Rodríguez, 2003) to forestall any feelings of suspicion. 
The question about areas of specialization usually asked 
since Kearl, Pope and others (1979) was also omitted, 
as it was assumed there would be a great variety of 
answers given the heterogeneity of the population.
The third rule was that, to avoid so-called 
“neutrality bias” (when someone does not wish to 
choose, is uninterested or has no opinion on the 
subject), a scale of just four possible responses was 
chosen: strongly disagree, disagree, agree or strongly 
agree. As Frary (1996, p. 3) establishes: “There is 
no assurance whatsoever that a subject choosing the 
middle scale position harbors a neutral opinion. A 
subject’s choice of the scale midpoint may result from: 
Ignorance, Uncooperativeness, Reading difficulty, 
Reluctance to answer, or Inapplicability.” This runs 
counter to Likert’s original scale, which contains an 
odd number of options because it includes a midpoint 
response, and also contrasts, in our context, with the 
practice of Kearl, Pope and others (1979) and their 
followers, who often provided just three options, 
including a midpoint one. The scale for this study was 
similar to that employed by Caminal and Rodríguez 
(2003), however.
The f inal rule for the formal design of the 
questionnaire was that questions were framed so as to 
avoid the so-called “halo effect”. Under the influence 
of this effect, an answer to a particular question might 
be biased if the respondent associated it with some 
personality, group or political party. For example, 
although the survey contains propositions on public 
finance issues, none of them makes any reference to 
the so-called “new public finances” (“nueva hacienda 
pública”), a term coined at the start of Vicente Fox’s 
six-year administration (2000-2006).
As a pilot test, a printed version of the questionnaire 
was distributed among participants at a convention of 
the National Association of Economists (CNE) in 
September 2005. The 38 people who completed it 
(anonymously, as requested) had no objections to the 
form or substance of the survey. The next step was 
to design a mechanism for general application of the 
questionnaire. Although the ideal procedure would 
have been to treat all the country’s economists as the 
target population and take a random sample, in practice 
the study population had to be reduced substantially. 
This was due to a number of factors. To begin with, 
there was no reliable register of all economists based 
in Mexico. Nor was a fast, efficient ordinary postal 
service available. Lastly, there was the need to ensure 
respondents’ anonymity. This last point might seem 
superfluous at first sight, but it is not in Mexico, where 
surveys have to be as impersonal as possible to have 
any prospect of being answered.
For all these reasons, it was decided that the most 
effective way of presenting the questionnaire was over 
the Internet, even though this would mean ruling out 
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a large number of economists who had no Internet 
access, many of them in the provinces. Thus, given 
that segments of the study population were excluded 
because they had no access to the Internet, and because 
it cannot be claimed a priori that this exclusion 
produced no significant biases in the results, the areas 
of agreement and controversy discussed in this work 
must be understood to exist among economists who 
are both Mexican residents and Internet users, rather 
than all Mexican economists as a group.
The questionnaire was posted on the CNE web 
portal on an unrestricted access basis during October 
and November 2005. Invitations to respond were 
issued in two ways. First, invitations were e-mailed to 
432 economists whose addresses were collected from 
information available on Mexican university portals 
and from the portals of government offices involved 
with economic matters (this compilation was exhaustive 
rather than stratified). Second, CNE representatives in 
the provinces received personal invitations. Although 
this variant was not originally provided for in the 
sample design, the CNE thought it advisable to notify 
state-level representatives that there was a survey 
on its portal. How many CNE member economists 
received the invitation to respond to the survey? In 
principle, it was received by the presidents of all the 
state associations (in Mexico there are 31 states plus 
the Federal District). Although some of them may in 
turn have invited other members of their associations 
to answer the survey, there is no evidence that this was 
done formally in any state. In any event, the anonymous 
character of the survey and its immediate availability 
over the Internet means that there can be no assurance 
that only 464 (= 432 + 32) economists were aware of 
its existence. Others may well have been informed 
about it by some of those who were personally invited 
by this author or the CNE.
The questionnaire was answered by 360 economists 
residing in Mexico.1 Given all the caveats in the previous 
paragraph, it is not possible to affirm that the acceptance 
rate was 78%, as the figures suggest; the actual percentage 
may have been lower. Nonetheless, we venture to suggest 
that the acceptance rate was certainly higher than those 
obtained by Kearl, Pope and others (1979), with 33% 
acceptance; Frey, Pommerehne and others (1984), with 
45%; Block and Walker (1988), with 33%; and Ricketts 
and Shoesmith (1992), with 36%. If we are right, we 
believe that the improvement is due to the ease with 
which surveys can be responded to over the Internet. 
Even so, we must acknowledge that non-responders can 
significantly affect the sample composition.
The profiles of the economists who answered the 
survey were as follows:
— Age: between 18 and 75, with a median of 42.
— Sex: 21% female and 79% male.
— Academic level: 6% were degree course students 
while 22% had a first degree, 38% a master’s and 
34% a doctorate.
— Place where highest qualification obtained: 68% in 
Mexico, 22% in the United States (or Canada), 8% 
in Europe and 2% in another country or region.
— Sector of employment: 46% public university, 18% 
private university, 14% federal public sector, 11% 
private sector, 9% state or municipal public sector 
and 2% other.
As can be seen from the different educational 
levels and the high percentage of respondents working 
in universities, the sample was skewed towards 
academic economists and somewhat against those 
working in the private sector, but not against those 
working in the public sector (23% seems about right). 
There was also substantial variation in ages and places 
of study, while the shares of the two sexes would seem 
to be representative of the target population. Lastly, 
the percentage of respondents with a postgraduate 
qualification is certainly too high to be representative of 
the economist population in general. It will be recalled 
that, owing to the character of the survey design 
itself, the study population was limited to economists 
with Internet access (and an e-mail address available 
from the Internet). Because most of these work in 
universities, the likelihood of their being qualified 
above degree level is much higher than for the general 
run of economists.
1 A total of 372 replies were received, but 12 of these were from 
economists living outside Mexico and so had to be disregarded. 
Of the other 360, eight were from computers that did not have a 
unique ip (Internet protocol) address. However, given that files from 
the same ip address were different in almost all respects and that 
the respondents concerned were mainly young, we assumed they 
were economics students using shared computers to complete the 
questionnaire.
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Table 1 shows the questionnaire used and the results 
obtained in terms of response frequencies. It is worth 
pointing out that of the 30 propositions it included, 
half relate to microeconomic issues and the other half 
to macroeconomic ones; in turn, each of these halves 
divides almost equally into positive and normative 
propositions.2 Again, as mentioned earlier, we tried to 
make as many questions as possible similar to the 30 
asked by Kearl, Pope and others (1979), and again by 
subsequent authors, but we had to discard 10 of them 
as obsolete. Translated as literally as possible, the first 
20 questions in our questionnaire corresponded to the 
following questions in Kearl, Pope and others: 1-5, 7, 
9-10, 12-16, 18, 20, 23, 25, 26 and 29-30. Questions 
21 to 30 in table 1 are new.
The information provided by table 1 would be 
incomplete if, in addition to the response percentages 
given there, it did not present a measurement of the 
degree of agreement or disagreement encountered 
for each question. Accordingly, relative entropy, 
symbolized here by ε, was calculated as the measure 
of disagreement; this is the measure that has been 
employed in all studies of this type.
The description of this statistic is as follows. 
Given that the number of categories is always four in 
our case, if pi denotes the relative frequency for each 
option, the entropy associated with the range of possible 
responses for each question is defined as
where, following Shannon, the logarithm is base 2, 
although the natural logarithm could well be used 
with very similar results. This entropy function has 
a maximum of 2 when each of the options is chosen 
by exactly a quarter of respondents, in which case 
there is zero consensus and maximum disagreement. 
Conversely, this function has a minimum of 0 when 
just one of the four options is selected by everyone, 
in which case there is maximum consensus. To obtain 
a range of 0 to 1 for this measure, given that the 
maximum possible entropy in our case is 2, we can 
define relative entropy as ε = E / 2.
Table 2 presents this entropy for each of the 30 
questions. Its last two columns also show the relative 
entropies obtained in similar surveys in the United 
States and France. These results correspond to our first 
20 questions, as they are similar to those of Kearl, Pope 
and others (1979). It should be stressed that the results 
for these two countries are not strictly comparable to 
ours, since those surveys were conducted over 20 years 
ago. Nonetheless, we will refer occasionally to these 
two columns in the discussion that follows, chiefly 
because of the striking difference between the pattern 
of consensus in the United States and France, the 
Mexican case being similar to the latter’s.
Tables 1 and 2 contain some results that were 
predictable and others that were quite unexpected. The 
two propositions that commanded the greatest consensus 
(the least entropy in table 2), and indeed the only ones 
whose median was the extreme response “strongly 
agree” (in bold in table 1), were propositions 8, “The 
distribution of income in and between countries should 
be more equal” and 9, “Antitrust laws should be used 
vigorously to reduce monopoly power from its current 
level”. It is not surprising that the first of these should 
have elicited a high degree of consensus, although it is 
worth noting that a less general proposition, “Income 
distribution in the industrialized countries ought to be 
more equitable”, was among those on which United 
States economists disagreed most among themselves 
(ε = 0.88 in table 2), whereas there was a moderate 
degree of consensus among French economists.
Again, there is a notably high level of agreement 
among Mexican economists on the need to apply 
antitrust laws vigorously. This finding is strengthened 
when we observe that the proposition which ranked 
third in terms of consensus (a negative one on this 
occasion, however) was number 19, “Consumer 
protection laws generally reduce economic efficiency”. 
That these answers should be so polarized perhaps 
reflects the great industrial concentration currently seen 
in key sectors of the economy, and the defencelessness 
III
General results
2 Section V gives a detailed presentation of the matrix classification 
of the propositions identified using these criteria.
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TABLE 1
Questionnaire: Response percentages and medians
(Percentages, medians in bold)
Proposition 1 2 3 4
 Strongly Disagree Agree Strongly 
 disagree   agree
1. Tariffs and import quotas reduce general economic welfare 9 43 35 13
2. The government should be an employer of last resort 15 40 33 12
3. The money supply is more of an important target than interest  18 51 24 7
 rates for monetary policy
4. Cash payments are superior to transfer-in-kind 6 36 44 14
5. Flexible exchange rates offer an effective international monetary  4 23 52 21
 arrangement
6. A minimum wage increases unemployment among young and/or  17 38 33 12
 unskilled workers
7. Fiscal policy has a significant effect on a less than fully employed  4 18 57 21
 economy
8. The distribution of income in and between countries should  1 3 36 60
 be more equal
9. Antitrust laws should be used vigorously to reduce monopoly power  1 4 43 52
 from its current level
10. Inflation is primarily a monetary phenomenon 14 35 35 16
11. The government should base its social policies on a negative income  7 37 48 8
 tax when incomes are inadequate
12. Wage-price controls should be used to control inflation 23 45 28 4
13. A ceiling on rent reduces the quantity and quality of housing available 4 18 55 23
14. Effluent taxes represent a better approach to pollution control than  5 22 53 20
 the imposition of pollution ceilings
15. The level of government spending should be reduced (disregarding  17 43 29 11
 expenditures for stabilization)
16. The federal budget should be balanced over the business cycle  2 15 63 20
 rather than yearly
17. The redistribution of income is a legitimate task for government 2 10 48 40
18. In the short run, unemployment can be reduced by increasing the  12 43 40 5
 rate of inflation
19. Consumer protection laws generally reduce economic efficiency 19 63 17 1
20. The economic power of labour unions should be significantly curtailed 5 22 42 31
21. Every central bank should include employment and/or economic  10 20 38 32
 growth among its objectives
22. Genetically modified crops have a positive effect on the economy 10 32 51 7
23. Economic fluctuations are mainly caused by aggregate supply impacts 5 57 34 4
24. Direct subsidies to firms are generally unjustifiable 4 36 43 17
25. The State should tax or control international flows of speculative capital 8 20 44 28
26. The energy sector should be treated like any other sector where  18 34 28 20
 private investment is concerned
27. The more independent the central bank, the better for economic  5 29 43 23
 stability and growth
28. Income taxes should be the mainstay of national tax systems 9 36 40 15
29. Private-sector involvement in the operation of public infrastructure  13 47 33 7
 is typically inefficient
30. Nature reserves should be protected even at the price of lower  5 24 51 20
 economic growth
Source: Prepared by the author.
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of economic fluctuations. In the first case, 83% of 
respondents agreed that it was advisable to balance the 
budget over the cycle rather than yearly. This opinion 
is not only interesting but important too, since it 
stands in stark contrast to a law passed in early 2006 
instructing the Mexican federal government to do just 
the opposite. Regarding the other proposition, only 38% 
agreed that aggregate supply impacts were the main 
cause of the business cycle (as so-called real business 
cycle theory suggests), whereas the other 62% assigned 
the leading role to changes in aggregate demand (the 
Keynesian view).
What about the propositions that attracted the 
least consensus? As might perhaps have been expected 
in a country where a great deal of controversy has 
traditionally surrounded the energy sector, the greatest 
relative entropy was obtained for proposition 26. 
Opinions were divided almost equally between those 
who were for private investment in the sector and 
those who were against it. This polarization extended 
to the percentages strongly agreeing or disagreeing 
(20% and 18%).
The second most controversial proposition 
was number 10 (“Inflation is primarily a monetary 
phenomenon”), since votes were almost equally divided 
for and against. It is interesting to note that, on this 
occasion, the relative entropy obtained was closer to 
the United States than the French level. Indeed, as can 
be inferred from Block and Walker (1988, table 3), the 
consensus on the subject among French economists was 
due to the fact that the great majority of them (more 
than two thirds!) disagreed with the monetarist position, 
rather than for the opposite reason.
There was also very substantial disagreement 
over proposition 6 (“A minimum wage increases 
unemployment”). Although the proposition has attracted 
a degree of consensus in almost all the countries where 
surveys of this type have been applied, this was not so 
among the Mexican economists, most of whom (55%) 
came out against it.
Ranking alongside the above proposition in terms 
of relative entropy was proposition 21 (“Every central 
bank should include employment and/or economic 
growth among its objectives”), a subject that has 
been under discussion lately in Mexico. If this were 
so, this set of mandates would be similar to that of 
the United States Federal Reserve, which is obliged 
under the second section of the law governing it to 
pursue simultaneously the objectives of maximum 
employment, stable prices and moderate long-term 
interest rates. The main reason why the United States 
TABLE 2
Mexico, the United States and France: 
Relative entropies
 Proposition Mexico  United States France
  ε Position ε ε
  (%)  (%) (%)
 1 87 20 48 85
 2 92 26 84 91
 3 86 18 87 90
 4 84 16 68 90
 5 82 11 63 83
 6 93 27 66 74
 7 78 7 67 69
 8 61 1 88 80
 9 64 2 79 66
 10 94 29 86 66
 11 80 8 71 86
 12 86 18 58 84
 13 80 8 48 86
 14 82 11 84 88
 15 91 25 88 88
 16 69 4 82 87
 17 75 6 81 71
 18 82 11 90 85
 19 68 3 85 50
 20 88 22 87 81
 21 93 27 … …
 22 81 10 … …
 23 69 4 … …
 24 83 14 … …
 25 90 23 … …
 26 98 30 … …
 27 87 20 … …
 28 90 23 … …
 29 85 17 … …
 30 83 14 … …
Source: Author’s own figures and data from Block and Walker 
(1988, table 4).
of many Mexican consumers. Alongside this, however, 
it might also be conjectured that these answers had 
an ideological facet, as both propositions entailed 
government intervention. Indeed, as table 2 shows, 
both also commanded a very high degree of consensus 
among French economists, whereas among those in 
the United States, with their greater reluctance to 
countenance government interference, there was more 
disagreement.
The other two propositions that elicited a high 
degree of consensus among Mexican economists are 
classics of the macroeconomic literature: number 
16, on the advisability of a countercyclical policy 
in government spending, and 23, on the main cause 
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At the end of section II there was a summary of 
respondents’ characteristics in terms of age, sex, 
academic level, country where they obtained their 
highest academic qualif ication, and current place 
of employment. In this section we shall conduct an 
analysis of the response patterns obtained when some of 
these characteristics are controlled for. For example, are 
there generational differences? Is gender significant? 
Is it relevant that a third of respondents obtained their 
highest academic qualification abroad?
To find answers to questions of this type, it is 
first necessary to divide respondents into the two 
relevant subgroups and then establish, for each of the 
30 propositions, the null hypothesis that the answers 
of both subgroups come from the same population. 
In this study, each of these hypotheses will be tested 
using the non-parametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, 
which has the great advantage over a number of other 
tests of not placing any restriction on the distribution of 
the responses. Table 3 presents the p values of this test 
for each division (column) and each proposition (line). 
It may be worth recalling here that p, the probability 
value, is the empirical significance level of the test of 
hypothesis, so that when this exceeds the significance 
level α selected by the researcher (a level commonly 
set at 5%), the null hypothesis that the answers come 
from the same population cannot be rejected.
The second column of table 3 presents the p 
values for testing the null hypothesis that there are 
no generational differences; i.e., the hypothesis that 
the answers of economists aged up to 42 (the median 
age) and the answers of those older than this come 
from the same population. As the table shows, this 
hypothesis can be rejected at the 5% significance 
level for just three questions. The first proposition on 
which there were was significant disagreement was 20, 
concerning significant curtailment of union power. The 
divergence, it should be stressed, occurred particularly 
at the extremes of the distributions: while 9% of the 
youngest strongly disagreed with this statement, just 
2% of the older economists did so; conversely, while 
22% of the youngest strongly agreed, this proportion 
was 38% among the oldest. Could this result indicate 
a more leftward-leaning ideological position among 
the younger economists? This claim could perhaps 
be made, especially in the light of the responses to 
the other two propositions for which there was an 
age divide. Number 26 asserted that the energy sector 
should be treated like any other sector where private 
investment was concerned, and while 60% of the 
younger economists disagreed or strongly disagreed 
with this, only 43% of older economists did so. Lastly, 
proposition 27, which stated that the more independent 
the central bank, the better for economic stability and 
growth, was disagreed with by 42% of the younger 
economists and only 26% of the older ones.
The third column of table 3 divides respondents 
by sex. What it shows, strikingly, is that there is not a 
single proposition for which, using the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test, the null hypothesis of answers coming 
from the same population can be rejected. This finding 
is identical to that of Caminal and Rodríguez (2003) 
among Spanish economists, but is somewhat at variance 
with other studies. In the case of Canada, for example, 
there were divides between women and men for more 
than a fifth of the questions put by Block and Walker 
(1988). The greatest differences surfaced in relation 
to the proposition about the virtues of free trade, with 
women proving far more sceptical (Block and Walker, 
1988, p. 143). In our case, however, the p value for 
proposition 1 was so high that we can safely say that 
the responses of male and female Mexican economists 
in relation to free trade showed no differences in 
distribution, which does not mean that there was 
central bank has all these responsibilities at once is, of 
course, that it is not independent. The Mexican central 
bank is independent, however, and this may explain the 
divergence in views on this proposition.
We invite readers to continue reviewing the 
remaining propositions in tables 1 and 2, where some 
rather unexpected results are to be found. To give just 
one example, 58% of respondents were in favour of 
statement 22 to the effect that genetically modified 
crops have a positive effect on the economy. In relative 
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consensus; taken as a whole, indeed, the survey 
population displayed a high level of disagreement on 
the subject (ε = 0.87, as shown in table 2).
The fourth column of table 3 divides respondents 
into those with a first degree at most and those with 
a postgraduate qualification (master’s or doctorate). 
In this case there are six propositions for which the 
hypothesis that both sets of responses came from the 
same population can be rejected. These propositions are 
listed below, and the figures in brackets alongside them 
are the percentages of respondents with and without 
postgraduate qualifications who agreed or strongly 
agreed with them: 1, on free trade (33% and 55%); 
11, on negative taxes (39% and 67%); 12, on price 
controls (42% and 29%); 15, on government spending 
(52% and 35%); 21, on central bank objectives (84% 
and 64%); and 25, on the Tobin tax (83% and 67%). 
As can be seen when all the figures in brackets are 
TABLE 3
p values of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
(Values significant at 5% are in bold)
 Proposition Agea Sex With/without Studied in Studied in Working in public
    postgraduate Mexico or Mexico or or private
    qualificationb United Statesc Europed universitye
 1 0.99 0.99 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.01
 2 0.44 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.85 0.24
 3 0.82 0.99 0.97 0.99 1.00 1.00
 4 0.97 0.96 0.14 0.00 0.91 0.95
 5 0.08 1.00 0.55 0.01 1.00 0.00
 6 0.97 1.00 0.13 0.00 1.00 0.06
 7 0.89 0.73 1.00 0.19 1.00 0.08
 8 0.53 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.98 0.64
 9 1.00 0.42 0.18 0.10 0.72 0.33
 10 0.09 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.31
 11 0.06 0.62 0.00 1.00 0.98 1.00
 12 0.56 1.00 0.03 0.01 0.37 0.12
 13 1.00 0.89 0.06 0.00 1.00 0.00
 14 1.00 0.53 0.76 0.58 0.71 0.98
 15 0.15 0.26 0.03 1.00 1.00 0.17
 16 1.00 0.65 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.11
 17 0.08 0.60 0.12 1.00 1.00 0.96
 18 0.73 1.00 0.15 0.80 1.00 0.84
 19 0.20 0.70 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.14
 20 0.01 0.23 0.10 0.72 1.00 0.02
 21 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.03
 22 1.00 0.17 0.79 0.00 1.00 0.18
 23 0.36 0.82 0.06 0.14 1.00 0.43
 24 1.00 0.99 0.95 0.11 0.62 0.05
 25 0.37 0.79 0.04 0.00 0.53 0.04
 26 0.01 0.56 0.31 0.01 0.96 0.04
 27 0.02 1.00 1.00 0.32 1.00 0.17
 28 0.96 1.00 0.98 0.80 0.99 0.38
 29 1.00 1.00 0.91 0.04 1.00 0.00
 30 0.21 1.00 0.88 0.97 0.96 1.00
Source: Prepared by the author.
a Division between those aged up to 42 (the median) and those older than this.
b Division between those with a first degree at most and those with a postgraduate qualification (master’s or doctorate).
c Division only within the subgroup of respondents whose highest academic qualification was obtained in Mexico or the United States.
d Division only within the subgroup of respondents whose highest academic qualification was obtained in Mexico or Europe.
e Only includes the subgroup of respondents who were working or studying at a university. The division is between public and private 
universities.
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compared, the views of respondents with postgraduate 
qualifications generally tended to be more conservative 
and closer to orthodox economic theory.
The fifth and sixth columns present the most 
surprising findings of this section. The first of these 
covers respondents whose highest qualification was 
obtained in a Mexican or United States university. 
The same thing was done in the sixth column, except 
that Europe was substituted for the United States. The 
contrast in the results is striking. While the p values of 
the fifth column indicate that there were 13 propositions 
for which the null hypothesis could be rejected in the 
case of the Mexico-United States division, in the sixth 
column there is just one such proposition, number 1. 
That is, those obtaining their highest qualification in a 
Mexican university had a very similar response pattern 
to those doing so in a European one, but a markedly 
different pattern from those obtaining it in a United 
States (or Canadian) university.
This deserves a closer look. The propositions on 
which there was an appreciable divide between those 
obtaining their highest qualification in Mexico and 
those obtaining it in the United States will now be 
presented, together with the percentages of respondents 
agreeing with each proposition in each subgroup 
(starting with Mexican graduates): number 1, on free 
trade (39% and 75%); 4, on cash payments and transfer-
in-kind (53% and 75%); 5, on flexible exchange rates 
(69% and 89%); 6, on the minimum wage (38% and 
70%); 8, on income distribution (96% and 91%);3 10, 
on inflation (46% and 70%); 12, on price controls (37% 
and 21%); 13, on rents (73% and 94%); 21, on central 
bank objectives (77% and 50%); 22, on genetically 
modified crops (53% and 78%); 25, on the Tobin 
tax (80% and 46%); 26, on the energy sector (44% 
and 64%); and 29, on public infrastructure (45% and 
28%). For each of the propositions cited, economists 
graduating in the United States clearly took a position 
that was ideologically more conservative (or liberal, in 
the European sense of the term).
Lastly, the final column of table 3 establishes a 
division based on where respondents work. Although 
we assumed prior to the survey that this might 
prove to be a key variable in explaining the different 
response patterns, the fact is that we did not find 
appreciable differences in the answers given between, 
for instance, those working in universities and those 
working elsewhere (in the public or private sector) or, 
to give another example, those working in the public 
sector and those working in the private sector. The 
only major divides were found in the subgroup of 
respondents working in a public university and those 
doing so in a private university. As can be observed 
in the column mentioned, the equal distribution 
hypothesis can be rejected at the 5% significance level 
for nine propositions. We invite readers to note which 
these are, although it may be enough to point out that 
these propositions belong to the broader set of the 13 
propositions on which those obtaining their highest 
qualification in Mexico were at variance with those 
obtaining it in the United States. This coincidence is 
not surprising either since, for example, an academic 
with a Mexican or European postgraduate qualification 
is far more likely to be working in a public university 
than a private one, while the opposite is true of those 
graduating from some United States university.
V
The micro/macro and positive/normative 
dichotomies
In his influential work on economic methodology, Friedman 
(1953) argues that economic policy disagreements 
between economists derive not so much from subjective 
differences as from different predictions about the 
consequences of taking action. Samuelson (1966), on 
the other hand, claims that agreement and disagreement 
among economists partly depend on the degree to 
which different value judgements converge and diverge; 
furthermore, Samuelson warns, forecasts themselves are 
ultimately subjective in character.
3 Proposition 8 elicited widespread assent in both groups; the 
difference lay in the fact that 65% of those obtaining their highest 
qualification in Mexico said they strongly agreed, while only 41% 
of the other group said the same.
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In an effort to clarify the above, it is well worth 
turning to the hackneyed but serviceable classification 
of economic policies into those that are positive 
(descriptions, “this can be done”) and those that are 
normative (prescriptions, “this ought to be done”). 
Samuelson would be at home with this distinction, 
but not Friedman, for whom all that distinguishes any 
economic policy is the effect it would have if adopted. 
Thus, for Friedman any economic proposition is 
essentially positive in character. The counterpart to this 
extreme posture is Myrdal (1954), who very eloquently 
upholds precisely the opposite thesis: economics is 
essentially normative in nature.
We took the intermediate point of view to 
establish, much as Kearl, Pope and others (1979) do, 
the hypothesis that positive propositions ought, at 
least on paper, to command greater consensus than 
normative ones. Similarly, and once again following 
the authors cited, we established a second hypothesis: 
microeconomic propositions, with their narrower 
scope, ought to command greater consensus than 
macroeconomic ones.
We put these two hypotheses to the test by 
constructing a matrix to divide the questions in the 
survey accordingly. This classification is necessarily 
subjective to some degree, as is illustrated by proposition 
26, which might have a positive character in many other 
countries but must be classified as normative in Mexico 
because of the strong feelings it arouses. With this 
caveat, we shall now present the matrix.
• Positive microeconomic propositions: 1, on 
free trade; 4, on cash payments and transfer-in-
kind; 6, on the minimum wage; 13, on rents; 
14, on pollution control; 24, on subsidies to 
businesses; 28, on direct taxes; and 29, on public 
infrastructure.
• Normative microeconomic propositions: 8, on 
income distribution; 9, on economic regulation; 
17, on income redistribution; 19, on consumer 
protection; 20, on unions; 22, on genetically 
modified crops; and 26, on the energy sector.
• Positive macroeconomic propositions: 3, on 
monetary policy; 5, on flexible exchange rates; 7, 
on fiscal policy; 10, on inflation; 18, on the Phillips 
curve; 23, on the real business cycle; and 27, on 
central bank independence.
• Normative macroeconomic propositions: 2, on 
government employment; 11, on negative taxes; 
12, on price controls; 15, on government spending; 
16, on countercyclical policy; 21, on central bank 
objectives; 25, on the Tobin tax; and 30, on nature 
reserves.
This classification was used to test the hypotheses 
described earlier. This was done by means of a two-
factor variance analysis (2x2 ANOVA), taking relative 
entropy as the dependent variable and examining 
variability within and between the subsamples. The F 
statistic values obtained were 0.96 and 0.91 for micro/
macro and positive/normative dichotomies, respectively. 
Since the corresponding p values of the F statistic (with 
1 and 26 degrees of freedom) were 0.34 and 0.35, 
the null hypothesis that a single population generated 
the entropies observed in the subsamples could not 
be rejected at the 5% significance level. The same 
conclusion was obtained for the interaction between 
the two classes (the p value obtained was 0.07). In 
plain language, the degree of consensus (or dissension) 
among Mexican economists does not seem to depend 
on the micro/macro character of the proposition, or on 
whether this is more positive than normative.
This result contrasts with that obtained by Kearl, 
Pope and others (1979), who found that among United 
States economists there was more consensus on the 
positive propositions than on the normative ones, and 
on the microeconomic ones than on the macroeconomic 
ones. The result also contrasts, although to a lesser 
degree, with that of Ricketts and Shoesmith (1992), 
who found that positive propositions (although not 
microeconomic ones) commanded greater agreement 
among British economists. Nonetheless, our finding 
seems to be the rule rather than the exception, 
since results identical to ours were obtained by 
Frey, Pommerehne and others (1984) in the case of 
Austrian, French, German and Swiss economists, and 
by Block and Walker (1988) in the case of Canadian 
economists.
Might there be any other elements that could 
help explain the areas of agreement and disagreement 
among Mexican economists? Rather than continue to 
speculate, we let the data “speak for themselves” by 
employing the multivariate statistical tool known as 
factor analysis.4 This technique was used to establish 
the common variability among the 30 propositions 
by identifying a small number of latent variables that 
were linear combinations of the original variables. This 
4 For example, see Peña (2002).
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analysis yielded two factors that accounted for the great 
bulk of the correlations between the questionnaire 
responses.5
The first factor proved to have positive correlations 
with the following propositions in particular (the 
weights are given in brackets): 1, on free trade (0.59); 
5, on the effectiveness of flexible exchange rates (0.58); 
6, on the minimum wage and unemployment (0.53); 10, 
on inflation as a monetary phenomenon (0.52); 26, on 
investment in the energy sector (0.57); and 27, on the 
advantages of central bank independence (0.53). No 
proposition with a negative correlation had a weight 
of 0.50 or more.
The second factor proved to have positive 
correlations with the following propositions in 
particular: 8, on more equal income distribution (0.61); 
17, on income redistribution as a legitimate task of 
government (0.50); 21, on the inclusion of growth or 
employment among central bank objectives (0.50); and 
25, on the benefits of a Tobin tax (0.52). Once again, 
no proposal with a negative correlation had a weight 
of 0.50 or more.
We imagine that readers must have been as taken 
aback as we were upon seeing the two results above for 
the first time. The first factor can evidently be identified 
with strict orthodoxy and the second, at odds with the 
first, with a heterodoxy that smacks of Keynesianism. 
From the evidence set out above, and from a number of 
the findings described in section IV, a robust conclusion 
follows: rather than micro/macro and positive/normative 
dichotomies, it is the respondents’ ideology, partially 
derived from their academic training, that emerges as 
the main conditioning element in the answers given by 
the 360 economists surveyed—something that would 
have seemed perfectly obvious to economists as diverse 
as Marx, Myrdal and Schumpeter.
VI
Conclusions
This article has analysed the views expressed by a wide 
range of Mexican economists on a variety of economic 
propositions. Among the propositions that commanded 
the greatest assent were: equity in income distribution, 
vigorous use of antitrust and consumer protection laws, 
and the use of countercyclical fiscal policies. Among 
the propositions on which there was most dissension, 
meanwhile, were: private investment in the energy 
sector, the factors determining inflation, the minimum 
wage as a cause of unemployment and the objectives 
to be pursued by an independent central bank.
This paper has also analysed the response patterns 
of different groups of economists. No evidence was 
found of generational differences, nor were there 
significant divides between the opinions of male and 
female economists. A very important factor, however, 
was the place where the individual’s highest academic 
qualification was obtained. The response pattern of 
those obtaining it at universities in the United States 
(or Canada) was markedly to the right of the pattern 
found among those obtaining it at Mexican or European 
universities.
Section V of the study presented evidence that 
neither the positive or normative character of propositions 
nor their microeconomic or macroeconomic nature 
were elements that might help account for the degree 
of consensus or dissension among the respondents. 
Nonetheless, it also provided evidence that ideological 
outlook was a key factor in explaining correlations in 
replies.
To conclude, a final question needs to be asked: 
would conclusions similar to ours be obtained among 
the other economists of Latin America? This question 
will remain unanswered until colleagues in the other 
Latin American countries pick up the gauntlet.
(Original: Spanish)
5 The methodology followed might be of interest: (i) the value of 
the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin statistic for the 30 questions was 0.80, 
indicating that the propositions had significant common variability; 
(ii) consideration was given only to factors whose own values were 
greater than 1 (Kaiser’s rule); (iii) the varimax rotation was used in 
such a way that each of the two factors affected its own corresponding 
variables but not the others; and (iv) the first factor and the second 
explained 45% and 28% of the variance, respectively.
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